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Frances Berenson 
The shadowy figure of the 'subjectivist' has for long haunted moral 
philosophy. His lack of substance is mainly due to a complete lack of 
clarity as to the real character of that figure and philosophers, gener­
ally speaking, are most reluctant to pursue any such theme convinced 
that to do so would inevitably lead to some form of unacceptable 
relativism which, it is argued quite rightly, involves a radical abnega­
tion of any kind of objectivity. 
Objectivists believe that a system can be established where objective 
moral principles can be found which would rest on a firm foundation 
of rationality, apply without exception, provide a.nswers to moral 
questions as they arose and, above all, that they would have to be 
formulated from a strictly objective perspective ( whatever that may 
be ).  They would be principles which all conscientious moral reasoners 
would agree on and, as is demanded in most recent ethical theories, 
they would have to be directed towards society in general rather than 
to individuals. 
I wish to attempt to give the elusive shadow some substance in 
objective terms. In other words, I hope to show that a certain kind of 
moral subjectivism is not only entirely compatible with but also 
dependent on objectivity. I shall outline a particular subjectivist 
approach to morality based on a comparison of some thoughts of 
Wittgenstein and of Kierkegaard. 
The problem with most so called 'systems' of ethics is that apart 
from supplying a priori rules and principles, they also suggest justiA­
cations in the form of trying to supply an answer to the question 
'Why should I act morally?' Thus Utilitarianism has as its end the 
greatest happiness for the greatest number, an ultimately meaningless 
end. Kant provides a deAnite purpose or product of the Moral Law 
the summum bonum which involves achieving our own perfection 
and the happiness of others, and so on. 
Any attempt to answer the question 'Why should I act morally?' 
demands some kind of justiAcation yet the importance of moral integ­
rity should be self-evident. It is as much a part of us as the language 
we speak. By being language speakers, we acquire the concepts of right 
and wrong. What we choose to dD is another matter but the possibility 
of choosing the ethical way is open to everyone who possesses the 
concepts involved. When we ask: 'Why should I act morally? ', this is 
another way of asking - 'What advantage does morality bring? '. The 
very form of this question implies that we must look outside morality 
for something on which morality is to be based. 
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But the inst.ant we do this, then what is commended is not morality 
iudf fOT, surely, if the commendation is in terms of some further 
advantage., then the connection between that advantage and morality 
can only be a contingent one. It is quite immaterial how strong a con­
tingent connection it is, it will still not be morality itself which is being 
commended. 
The above issue lies at the centre of Kierkegaard's ethics. His 
notion of doublemindedness focuses precisely on what is involved in 
willing the good for the sake of the reward or for fear of punishment, 
i.e., for some further end. He calls these barriers to willing one thing -
the Good. Willing the good for the sake of the reward is double­
mindcd because it is not simpL., that two things are willed. If the 
reward could be obtained without willing the good then the good 
would not be willed at aa it is removed here. The same applies in the 
case of punishment; the genuine good is not willed. One should not 
fear punishment, one should fear to do wrong. 
False shame is another way of being double-minded. Kierkegaard 
writes: 
Each one who is not more ashamed before himself than 
before all others, will end by becoming the slave of men. 
For to be more ashamed in the presence of others than 
when alone, what else is this than to be more ashamed of 
seeming than of being? And turned abou� should not a 
man be more ashamed of what he is than of what he 
seems?1 
The rigid following of an a priori general rule, e.g., doing one's 
duty, can, at times, completely distort any moral worth an action may 
have. Yet the notion that duty is of central importance in moral 
actions has a long history. For Kant only actions done out of duty 
qualify as morally praiseworthy actions. D. Gauthier2 in a recent arti­
cle argues that duty has a central role to play in morality. He writes 
that allurement is not duty's way. Morality insists that we restrain our 
pursuits of self .. interest. By startling contrast P. Winch3 gives an excel .. 
lent example of how doing one's duty may completely distort the 
moral content of an action. Mrs. Solness in Ibsen's The Master Builder 
is obsessed with the notion of acting for the sake of duty. Her actions 
lack any spontaneity or any feeling of warmth towards others. They 
cease to have any connection with a genuine wish to do what one 
thinks is right; it is done to cover up resentments within her. When 
she is thanked for an overtly kind act her reply, that she is only doing 
her duty, deeply hurts the other person by its coldness and utter 
impersonality; it has no connection with morality whatsoever. 
Merely taking part in a ritual, like going to church every Sunday, is 
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not a moral action nor being coerced into something because one is 
told that it is one's duty. The notion of duty as presented here is a 
complicated one. It can, perhaps, be explicated in terms of what it is 
noc. Kierkegaard gives a satirical example of what is so often taken as 
doing one's duty and which has nothing to do with morality. He asks 
us to imagine a society of talking geese who went to church each Sun­
day and thus, having done their duty, occupied themselves for the rest 
of the week with getting soft and fat. 4 
In order to do one's duty, one must not only see it as a duty, but 
sense it, feel it as a duty. A duty done without this special understand­
ing is ill no sense connected with one's moral integrity. Judge Wil­
liam, who represents the ethical way of life in Kierkegaard's Either/Or, 
says: 
I have not been afraid of duty, it has not appeared before 
me as an enemy which would disturb the bit of happiness 
and joy I had hoped to preserve through life; rather it has 
appeared before me as a friend, a confidante . . .  s 
The notion of duty, as usually presented, demands a sort of con­
stant battle between what one is and what one does or ought to do. It 
demands a constant subduing of one's wishes for the sake of what 
duty demands of us. 'Duty' is supposed to guarantee an independent, 
rational approach, independent from subjective opinions, safeguard­
ing l!loral judgments from being based on 'mere opinions' where what 
one feels is right, is right. What is completely overlooked in such 
accounts is that various opinions held must be about something intel­
ligible and thus available for rational discussion, argument and judg­
ment as to their validity; all of which involves objectivity rather than 
some kind of irrational subjectivity. 
The distinction between what one is and what one does results 
directly from the kind of accounts, given above, of the role which 
duty plays in moral action. Having established this distinction, the 
concern is then exclusively with the latter which is supposed to 
represent the only objectively promising way for theories of ethics in 
general. But our particular judgments of good and evil, right or 
wrong, and our decisions how to act (what one does) are not independ­
ent of our attitudes to life as a whole. Both Wittgenstein and Kierke­
gaard were most interested in the importance of our attitudes to life 
and what they have to say reveals that they were deeply aware of a 
vital link or connection between what we are which enables us and 
dictates to us how we arrive at decisions on how to act in situations 
with a moral content. 
Wittgenstein's enigmatic remark that 'Ethics and Aesthetics are 
one'6, was designed to lay stress on the vital relation between what 
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one is and one's actions. This remark has often been objected to via 
arguments which stress the alleged contrast between ethics and aes­
thetics thus, it is thought, denying any relation between them. It is 
argued that ethical judgments are made by reference to general princi­
ples while aesthetic judgments are made by reference to the t.iery par­
ticular featureJ of what is judged. Further, while in ethical situations 
we act towards some end, in an aesthetic situation we experience 
something for its own sake. The conclusion reached from these con· 
trasts is that ethics and aesthetics cannot be one because the differen­
ces existing between them are too pronounced. 7 
This line of argument rests on a crucial mistake. Wittgenstein's 
notion of oneness is not of a complete identity of characteristics but 
of a common fundamental approach. Its most succinct description is 
given in the 1929 Uciure on Ethia8, where he stipulates that he will 
use the term 'ethics' in a sense which includes what he believes to be 
the most essential part of what is generally called Aesthetics. Ethics, 
he says, is 'the enquiry into what is valuable, or, into what is really 
important . . .  , the enquiry into the meaning of life, or into what makes 
life worth living . . .  '9 The judgment that something is ethically good is 
not one that states that something is good for some purpose or end 
but that it is good simpliciter, irrespective of any purpose it may fulfil, 
irrespective of any further end. He rejects totally the kind of character 
ization of ethics given above, i.e., the contrast between the ethical as 
action towards some end and the aesthetic as 'for its own sake' .  He is 
mostly concerned, as is Kierkegaard, with how one perceives particu­
lar features of a moral situation (dependent on what one is) and tak­
ing decisions of how to act. 
At this point one might object that if the above arguments are 
rejected then one is left with no way of appeal to any valid rules for 
judgments of right and wrong and that what follows from such a 
rejection is that morality is not a subject which need concern us 
seriously, that there is, perhaps, something strained and artificial 
about it. If there is no such thing as the objective good then there is 
no point in concerning ourselves philosophically with something that 
has no independent existence. In other words, if we reject the notioru 
of duty, or that of principles which are statable in propositional, gen­
eral terms, then the only alternative is some kind of subjectivity whe1 
we, necessarily, descend into the realm of vague opinions, which 
completely lack any objective substance. 
Wittgenstein, in the last part of the Tractatus says: 
What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence.10 
This was generally taken to mean that since we cannot express ethica 
matters in general, universal propositions, there is really nothing 
5
Berenson: Some Remarks About the Unutterable
Published by Digital Commons @Brockport, 2015
Some Remarks Abouz the Unutterable 65 
here of philo.sophical significance, i.e., the whole notion of ethics is 
spurious. What was missed, however, is that there must be something 
to be pa.sse.d ewer in silence. 
Both Wittgenstein's and Kierkegaard's approach to ethics are cer­
tainly not systems. They try to cont>ey what is meant by moral integ­
rity, and what does not count as a moral action and why. They try to 
describe the issues involved in the ethical way of life in a manner which 
brings out aspects of the greatest importance, aspects which are com­
pletely missed in most so called ' systems' of ethics. 
Engelmann captures beautifully the significance of Wittgenstein's 
remark: 
A whole generation of disciples was able to take Wittgen­
stein for a positivist because he has something of enor­
mous importance in common with the positivists: he 
draws a line between what we can speak about and what 
we must be silent about just as they do. The difference is 
only that they have nothing to be silent about. Positivism 
holds - and this is its essence - that what we can speak 
about is all that matters in life. Whereas Wittgenstein pas­
sionately believes that all that really matters in human life is 
precisely what, in his t1iew, we must be silent about. When he 
nevertheless takes immense pains to delimit the unimpor­
tant, it is not the coastline of that island which he is bent 
on surveying with such meticulous accuracy, but the 
boundary of the ocean.1 1 
Wittgenstein says: 
The sense of the world must lie outside the world. In the 
world everything is as it is, and everything happens as it 
does happen; in it no value exists - and if it did exist, it 
would have no value . . . .  
It must lie outside the world. 
And so it is impossible for there to be propositions of 
ethics. Propositions can express nothing that is higher. It is 
clear that ethics cannot be put into words. Ethics is 
transcendental. 12  
And again: 
There are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words. 
They make themseltJeS manifest. 13 
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Wittgenstein states clearly and unequivocally that there are no a 
priori facts in ethics, nor can there be any. Now, if something cannot 
be said to be right or wrong a.s a matter of f aa, then we cannot make 
any factual and final j udgments nor lay down universal rules. For 
Wittgenstein it is the un.sayable alone which has value. But what can­
not be said, i.e., stated in propositional form, may, nevertheless, be 
shown, explained , described or otherwise conveyed . 
Stephen Toulmin in an article on Wittgenstein writes: 
Even in his last years Wittgenstein still seemed to believe 
what he had said as early as the Tractatu.s - namely, that 
whatever belongs to the realm of the 'higher', whatever has 
'value' lies outside the boundaries of the utterable - he 
continued, like Kierkegaard, to seek some alternative way 
of conveying what could not be stated. And, since he him­
self was a man of strong moral passions, it is not surprising 
to find that, away from the formal lecture room, he exem­
plified in his own person that human tendency Gegen die 
Gren.ten der Sprache antUrennen, which was, in his eyes, one 
manifestation of the fundamental ethico-religious 
impulsc.14 
Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard share a view which is crucial for what 
follows. The former says that if someone tells me he believes in God 
and then asks if I also believe, my answer may be that I do not 
believe. But that answer does not mean that he is wrong in his belief. 
It is just that I fail to understand what is involved here, for him. I 
have no way of judging him to be wrong. Kierkegaard echoes this 
when he says that in trying to judge others we are really judging our­
selves. He means here that I am often in no position to judge the 
other man as I may not be able to know every aspect of a given situa­
tion the way the agent does, therefore, in judging, I use my own crite­
ria, the way I see it, the way I would choose to act, depending on what 
sort of person I am. 
By quoting some extracts from Wittgenstein's letters to Engelmann 
it can, perhaps, be made clearer what he himself felt: 
The poem by Uhland is really magnificent. And this is 
how it is: if only you do not try to utter what is unnutter­
able then nothing gets lost. But the unnutterable will be 
unnutterably-contained in what has been uttered.15  
From this letter it seems that Wittgenstein believes that poetry can 
express far more than everyday language. Kierkegaard, who tried to 
convey something about the unnutterable called himself a poet. 
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I have been morally dead for more than a year! From that 
you can judge for yourself whether I am fine or not . . . .  I 
had a taSk, did not do it, and now the failure is wrecking 
my life. I ought to have done something positive with my 
life . . . .  My life has really become meaningless and so it con­
sists only of futile episodes. 16 
. . . . I have now read The King of the Dark ChambeT (by 
Tagore). The play has not really made a deep impression 
on me . . . .  It seems to me as if all that wisdom has come out 
of the icebox; I should not be surprised to learn that he got 
it all secondhand by reading and listening (exactly as so 
many among us acquire their knowledge of Christian wis­
dom) rather than from his own genuine feeling. Perhaps I 
don't understand his tone; to me it does not ring like the 
tone of a man possessed by the truth. 17 
This particular letter, perhaps more than anything else, expresses 
the great similarity between Wittgenstein's and Kierkegaard's thought. 
This is exactly what Kierkegaard takes to be subjective truth, the only 
uuth possible in Ethics. This is, exactly as Wittgenstein expresses it, 
why Kierkegaard condemns the Christianity of the established 
Church, as second-hand acquisition of knowledge through what is 
preached at one, without feeling and thinking for oneself. 
In a letter to Ficker - a would-be publisher of the Tracratus - Witt-
genstein explains what the work is about: 
The book's point is an ethical one. I once meant to include 
in the preface a sentence which is not in fact there now but 
which I will write out for you here, because it will perhaps 
be a key to the work for you. What I meant to write, then, 
was this: My work consists of two parts: the one presented 
here plus all that I have not written. And it is precisely this 
second part that is the important one. My book draws lim­
its to the sphere of the ethical from the inside as it were, 
and I am convinced that this is the ONLY rigorous way of 
drawing those limits. In short, I believe that where many 
others today are just gassing, I have managed in my book 
to put everything firmly into place by being silent about 
it . . . .  For now, I would recommend you to read the preface 
and the conclusion, because they contain the most direct 
expression of the point of the book. 18 
In his lecture on Ethics, Wittgenstein tries to show what sort of thing 
can be conveyed and how we try to express something about the 
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unnuttcrablc. When discussing the word fgood' he draws a distinction 
between its ordinary use and its ethical use. He calls the everyday use ,  
the trivial or Telatic.ie sense and the ethical - the ethical or absolute 
scnae. The relative sense of fgood' is used when speaking of something 
which fulfils its function, e.g. , a good knife is a sharp knife, the right 
road is relative to a certain goal. He brings this distinction out by 
examples. If I deliberately choose to play tennis badly and say so, then 
no-one can blame me for it, except to say: 'That's all right then' .  If, 
however, I choose to tell a preposterous lie then another person will 
respond by saying: 'Well, you ought to behave better'. This is an 
absolute judgment of value, where� the previoy.s example was a rela­
tive judgment, a mere statement of fact and, as such, when put in a 
different form, it lO&eS the apearance of a judgment of value alto­
gether. No statement of fact can ever be a judgment of absolute value. 
In ethics there are no facts and therefore the 'good' cannot be defined. 
We can speak in metaphors in order to convey the ethical sense. 
The ethical belongs to a special form of life. What in Wittgenstein's 
sense we cannot speak about, is trying to define the 'good', trying to 
find rigid, a priori rules as to how one should act but this does not 
preclude us from trying to convey our feelings in a given situation nor 
trying to convey, to show what is involved in the ethical form of life 
as a given person sees it. It is essential, however, that one should only 
speak for oneself. Kierkegaard, who fully shares this view, always 
speaks to the solitary individual on whom alone his own ethical deci­
sions rest as does the responsibility for them. He writes on the first 
page of Purir, of Heart: 'To that solitary individual this little work is 
dedicated· .  
Wittgenstein speaks of the experience of feeling absolutely safe. We 
all know what it means to feel safe in ordinary life. To be safe means 
that it is physically impossible that certain things should happen to us, 
e.g., being run over by a car when I am safe in my room, but it makes 
no sense to say that I am absolutely safe, whatever happens. To say 
this, is to misuse the word 'safe'.  Yet we use the word allegorically 
when speaking of feeling absolutely safe and it conveys a meaning. 
One might want to say that if certain experiences make us attribute 
qualities to them which we call absolute, this shows that by the words 
we use, we do not mean nonsense. This, however, is not because we 
have not yet discovered the correct logical analysis of what we mean 
by ethical expressions but that no such analysis is possible because, if 
it were, we would then be back to dealing with facts, not values. As 
Wittgenstein puts it: 
The very nonsensicality of the expressions used is the very 
essence of these expressions. For all I wanted to do with 
them was just to go beyond the world and that is to say, 
9
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beyond significant language. My whole tendency, and I 
believe the tendency of all men who ever tried to write or 
talk Ethics, was to run against the boundaries of language. 
Ethics, so far as it springs from the desire to say something 
about the ultimate meaning of life, the absolute good, the 
absolute valuable, can be no science. What it says docs not 
add to our knowledge. But it is a document of a tendency 
in the human mind which I personally cannot hdp respect-
. d 1 1 9  mg eep y . . . .  
Because Wittgenstein says that he speaks in the first person in his lec­
ture on ethics as he believes this to be essential, he can only spealc and 
appear as a person speaking for himself, and because this attitude is 
for Kierkegaard, most important of all, it is what he tries to show 
throughout his works when he continually speaks to the individual 
alone - it is precisely for these reasons that they are both so often 
accused of subjectivism. 'Subjectivism',  as a term, stands for many 
and varied doctrines but they both use it in a very specific way. Kier­
kegaard's distinction between the subjective and the objective is Wit­
tgenstein's dichotomy of the absolute and the relative. They are both 
concerned with subjective truth - a notion which, as used here, has 
been continuously misunderstood and as a result wrongly dismissed 
on the grounds of having no objective basis whatsoever. 
Kierkegaard's view of objectivity is expressed clearly in the Post­
script. He writes: 
The objective accent falls on WHAT is said, 
the subjective accent on HOW it is said. 20 
The HOW is a striving. These are in no way incompatible with 'objec­
tivity' in the accepted sense. A few pages later, Kierkegaard compares 
the man who follows what others do, to one who at a banquet does 
not know what cutlery to use and looks desperately at others in order 
to imitate them. This tendency to the objective (in the special sense) 
turns everyone into an observer so that he becomes a copy of his fel­
lows, unable to think for himself. This kind of objectivity has a more 
serious consequence because the individual ceases to be fully respon­
sible for his actions as his actions become mere imitations, they are 
done without understanding and without feeling. 
Kierkegaard's use of the term 'subjective' involves showing the 
importance of language and of rational choice. In the Journal for 1840 
he states the importance of language. He says that for philosophers to 
be unbiased, they must take account of language and its whole signifi­
cance in relation to speculations. As he puts it: 
10
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. . .  we sometimes find the mistaken tendency of not wish­
ing to accept language as the freely appropriated 'given', 
but of giving it to oneself, . . .  where it easily ends in 
silence . . .  , or in personal isolation in complete gibberish.2 1  
He goes on to say that any arbitrarily formed langauge is bound to 
fail because it lack.s what he calls, a common denominator; for in lan­
guage •totum est pane sua prius' ,  i.e. , the structure, like Wittgen­
stein's rules of grammar, etc., is all important. This, I take to be the 
forerunner of the 'Private Language' argument. 
Kierkegaard's conception of subjectivity and truth points in a 
totally different direction from that of subjectivism which leads to 
scepticism and relativism. In the Journals he says: 
' I  certainly do not deny that I recognise an imperarit1e of 
understanding . . .  , but it must be taken up into my life, and that 
is what I now recognise as the most. important thing. zz 
By this he means that having a background of language and under­
standing which involves standards of right and wrong, acquired inter­
subjectively, we then have to use this understanding in order to make 
our own decisions in each individual case. From Kierkegaard's writ­
ings, particularly the Purity of Heart, it seems clear that a very strict 
rational approach is required, an open-eyed facing up to all aspects of 
oneself and the situation one finds oneself in. Purity of heart is the 
exposure to oneself of any double-mindedness an action may have, 
the exposure of evasion on the agent's part, or self-deception, or any 
other kind of self-excuses which prevent us from willing the good 
alone. Kierkegaard does not specify in any way what the good is. He 
leaves this to each individual because he recognises that the good can­
not be spoken about. He only shows what is at stake - the individual 
having an idea which governs his mode of life and a total commitment 
to this idea. 
The above view of the •Good' could be objected to on the grounds 
that whatever one decides is good, is good and, therefore, anything 
goes. The social dimension of an individual is crucial here. What one 
can meaningfully say or do, depends on inter-subjectivity, on the peo­
ple one lives with, has relationships with. One's relationships with 
other people teach us about standards which are available to us and 
which are intelligible through the common language spoken. Moral 
feelings and commitment go together with objective moral concepts; 
they are inseparable. Morality is social but I do not mean by this that 
it is 'societaP; bound to any given society.23 By 'social' I mean rela­
tionships between individual and individual, person to person; in 
other words, lived relationships with real people, not with 
abstractions. 
11
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However individual an action may be, it has still to be understood 
even though, perhaps, not approved of by others around us, it must 
be considered meaningful as op� to what Kierkegaard calls 'gib­
berish'. If a given action is such that others cannot understand how a 
decision was taken then we feel the need to ask all sorts of questions. 
Such a procedure underlines objectivity. To illustrate - Kierkegaard 
speaks 
of Brutus' son who conspired, while his father was consul, to 
restore the king of Rome to the throne, for which Brutus ordered his 
execution. We can understand to a large extent the pain it caused him 
to sentence his own son, yet he did what he saw to be right and just. 
Kierkegaard goes on: 
. . .  if Brutus had had a righteous son and yet would have 
ordered the lictors to execute him , who would have 
understood him?24 
For Kierkegaard, false id� refute themselves in experience and 
lead to a disintegration of a personality instead to its unification. He 
also points out that if an individual realises his ideu to have been 
wrong, then he must re,think his position. The notion of remorse is 
very important in his worlcs; it is closely bound up with his insistence 
that the individual constantly examine his ideu for signs of insincerity 
or bias. In Either/Or he writes: 
. . .  , it is very important to test oneself, lest some day one 
might have to beat a retreat to the point from which one 
started, and might have reason to thank God if one had to 
reproach oneself for nothing worse than a waste of time. 25 
It has been said of Kierkegaard that his notion of choice is that of 
an arbitrary, criterionless choice, whatever that means. This criticism 
could, perhaps, be levelled against Sartre but certainly not against 
Kierkegaard. The following, rather lengthy extract, makes it quite 
clear that choice is certainly never to be arbitrary: 
For me the instant of choice is very serious, not so much 
on account of the rigorous cogitation involved in weighing 
the alternatives, not on account of the multiplicity of 
thoughts which attach themselves to every link in the 
chain, but rather because there is danger afoot, danger that 
the next instant it may not be equally in my power to 
choose .. . .  For to think that for an instant one can keep 
one's personality a blank, or that strictly speaking one can 
break off and bring to a halt the course of the personal life, 
is a delusion. The personality is already interested in the 
choice before one chooses, and when the choice is post, 
12
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poned the personality chooses unconsciously, or the cho­
ice is made by obscure powers within us.26 
Choice then� is definitely rational and objective; unconscious or arbi­
trary choice is wrong and to be guarded against. 
Kierkegaard despises compromise of the sort 'I shall do both/and'. 
The choice has to be a definite either I or. Either the life of calculated 
pursuit of pleasure or a life of self-realisation through the pursuit of a 
worthwhile idea, a whole way of life. He is against any form of an aim­
less life. Life must have a purpose, The Good, whatever that may be. 
He who chex>ses the ethical, chooses the Good but here the Good is 
entirely abstract, only its being is posited. So nothing can be said 
about what the Good is, this must be passed over in silence. Here the 
same view is expressed as that in Wittgenstein's 38th letter, quoted 
previously. ln the Diapsalmata we find a passage which summarises 
the essence of the kind of ethics under discussion. Kierkegaard says 
that his soul always turns to the Old Testament and to Shakespeare: 
I feel that those who speak there are at least human beings: 
they hate, they love, they murder their enemies, and curse 
their descendants throughout all generations, they sin. 27 
He is most opposed to the drifter, the person who avoids any sort of 
responsibility or commitment and, therefore, does what he is told. He 
writes: 
Let it be your comfort and mine that the highest and most 
beautiful things in life are not to be heard about nor read 
about but, if one will, may be lived.28 
This is remarkably like Wittgenstein's view - that which cannot be 
uttered, can nevertheless be lived, ethics is action, a vital part of what 
one is and how one lives. The distinction that I have been most con­
cerned with in this paper is that between moral theorists with their 
abstract schema or systems and an ethic which is directed towards 
individuals who live their lives through personal relationships with 
others and who make moral choices about lived situations. Given the 
central importance of that distinction it might, perhaps, be captured 
or highlighted by an analogy from Aesthetics. R.K. Elliott, in his arti­
cle 'The Critic and the Lover of Art' writes: 
It is possible to distinguish two common types of approach 
of art. One I attribute to a person I shall call 'the critic' 
since critics often adopt it, the other to a person whom I 
shall call 'the lover of art'. Nowadays critics assert not that 
13
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the work must impose its authority on a totally disinter­
ested spectator but that it must be received sympathetically 
'on its own terms' .  This is a fair description of the lover's 
attitude. The difference between them emerges in their 
respective practice. Ultimately it involves differences in the 
kind of being attributed to the work and in the part which 
Art plays in the life of the individual, . . . .  The work 
becomes a part of his life not in the trivial sense that it has 
occupied his time but in the sense that it has engaged him 
in his depth and, it seems, has revealed its own depth to 
him.29 
In a similar way, both the moral theorist and Kierkegaard's and 
Wittgenstein's solitary individual, receive morality 'on its own terms'. 
The very telling differences between them emerges in their respective 
attitude. Ultimately, and crucially, everything depends on the kind of 
being attributed to ethics, to other persons and to the part that other 
persons play in one's life within personal relationships. These do not 
set up any kind of general, invariable ends or anything like it. They 
are lived, not in the trivial sense of occupying one's time but in the 
sense that one becomes engaged in them deeply and unreservedly; 
where one lives one's life from ':vithin a definite commitment. 
In summary, what emerges from Wittgenstein's and Kierkegaard's 
writings is the importance of moral integrity in life, the need for the 
individual to stand alone when confronted with ethical problems, the 
impracticability of general rules of judgment but not of rules of lan­
guage and of criteria which form a common background of intelligibil­
ity. Duty is part of the ethical form of life but it must not be done 
simply as a duty without full understanding of what that involves. The 
notions of temporal and eternal in Kierkegaard find a parallel in Wit­
tgenstein, the temporal being that which belongs to the world of pro­
positions and the eternal that which lies outside the world, that which 
has value. It is Wittgenstein's dichotomy of the relative and the 
absolute. 
The dominating thought in Kierkegaard's ethics is total commit .. 
ment to will to be and remain loyal to the Good. Commitment to a 
certain degree is double-minded. The demand for this is also present 
in Wittgenstein. Engelmann describes his attitude to life: 
. . .  an ethical totalitarianism in all questions, a single­
minded and painful preservation of the purity of the 
uncompromising demands of ethics, in agonizing awareness 
of one's own permanent failure to measure up to them. 
This is the demand Wittgenstein makes on himself.30 
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Both phi1060phers realise this constant failure. Kierkegaard starts 
several chapters in Puriry of Heart with ' lf it be possible for a man 
really in truth to will one thing, he must will the Good in truth' .  For 
both of them ethical action exists and the striving for it is what counts 
in life. As Kierkegaard expresses it, a man has the task not by word, 
nor merely by intention but by the sincere, inner concentration of his 
own life to unconditionally serve the Good in action. Commitment 
can only be subjective although the object of it is arrived at by 
rational, objective choice. This is the special kind of subjectivity that 
Kierkegaard insists on. 
Wittgenstein also stresses this when he insists on speaking in the 
first person on ethical issues. We cannot always be in a position to 
judge another person's actions as we may be unable to fully under­
stand what he feels in a given situation nor fully grasp the perspective 
from which he views it, e.g., the religious perspective. When dis­
agreements arise, certain explanations are possible because the com­
mon language we speak, but often they are only possible up to a 
point. Wittgenstein illustrates this.3 1  When one says that a piece of 
music makes one feel wobbly - one explanation could be - 'It is the 3 
against 4 rhythm'. If the person concerned says: 'Yes, it is this pecul­
iar rhythm I meant', we have an explanation but if he does not agree, 
this would not be an explanation. This is also relevant to the notion 
of commitment. Malcolm, in his account of Wittgenstein's death says 
that he found his remark: 'Tell them I had a wonderful life', strangely 
moving and mysterious, as his life was a tortured and unhappy one.32 
Here it is the worthwhileness of one's pursuits in spite of difficulties, 
the total commitment to it, which brings this particular kind of happ­
iness or self-realisation. It can only be understood by someone who 
understands how a given pursuit could do this. We may think a par­
ticular way of life a waste but as long as we can grasp how someone 
else could be happy, we understand the feelings of the man con­
cerned. If we cannot understand then nothing more can be offered by 
way of explanation, the showing how. This is what Kierkegaard means 
when he speaks of the serious observer, to whom it is possible to 
make oneself intelligible at a distance and to whom one can talk in 
silence. He uses the pseudonym Johannes de Silentio to underline the 
point. If this special understanding is present then communication is · 
possible, then something can be conveyed, if not - then nothing more 
can be shown and must be passed over in silence - unnuttered. 
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